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One of the many philosophical problems that we face in the Timaeus is raised by the claim that the God who created the world (from now on we shall call him 'Demiurge') 1 is good (Tim. 29d7-30a2). A satisfying explanation of Demiurge's goodness is far from easy, and different approaches have been proposed. However, in this paper I'll try to show that a clear, sufficient and relatively simple interpretation is possible, if we are based on the hypothesis that Timaeus follows the theory of causation in the Phaedo (including the distinction between 'safe' and 'elegant' cause) and the concept of the Form of the Good in the Republic.
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To be more specific, I'll try to show that the Form of the Good of the Republic is also presupposed in the Timaeus and it plays the same role, and we should consider it as a first principle of platonic cosmology, independent from the existence of Demiurge or even the Divine Paradigm (i.e. the model according to which the Demiurge creates the world). On first impression, this interpretation looks barely possible, since there is no direct reference in the text to this particular Form, with the possible exception of what is said at Tim. 46c7-d1. 3 In my opinion, this absence has to do with specific purposes Timaeus serves, and not with the abandonment of the Good as a cause. A close examination of the text might lead us to this conclusion.
So let me schedule the structure of this paper. In the first part I set out briefly what Plato says in the Timaeus about the relation between Demiurge and goodness, and some different approaches among scholars. In the second part I construct the argument that proves the existence of the Form of the Good in the Timaeus based on Plato's theory of causation that we find in the Phaedo. 
